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I. INTRODUCTION 
It was Here who saw possibilities of mixing his own formulas through 
re-mixing pre-recorded sound. 
-Houston A. Baker, Jr.l 
In calling this Comment Pragmatism Modified, I allude to Cath-
arine MacKinnon's Feminism Unmodified-her refusal to move her fem-
inism over to accommodate Marxism, liberalism, or any other pre-
feminist theory. 2 If feminism is not moving, perhaps pragmatism can 
bend toward feminism and other liberation-ended newcomers to theoreti-
cal discourse, including critical race theory.3 
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1. H. Baker, Sounding Post-modernism: Hybridity, The Rap Race, and Pedagogy for the 
1990's 2 (1989) (unpublished manuscript). This line refers to Kool DJ Herc's use of turntables and 
hip-hop acoustics. Professor Baker's choice to take the text of urban rap seriously is an example of 
the expanded inquiry I advocate in this essay for pragmatists. 
2. C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987). See also C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A 
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989) (providing an analysis of politics, sexuality, and the law 
from the perspective of women). 
3. "Critical race theory," as I use it, refers to the work of progressive legal scholars of color 
who are attempting to develop a jurisprudence that accounts for the role of racism in American law 
and that works toward the elimination of racism as part of a larger goal of eliminating all forms of 
oppression. Works I would include in this movement are, inter alia, Austin, Sapphire Boundl, 1989 
WIS. L. REv. 539; D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987); Ca1more, Exploring the Significance 
of Race and Class in Representing the Black Poor, 61 OR. L. REv. 201 (1982); Crenshaw, Race, 
Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Anti-Discrimination Law, 101 
HARv. L. REv. 1331 (1988); Dalton, Aids in Blackface, 1989 DAEDALUS 205; Delgado, When a 
Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REv. 95 (1989); Lawrence, The Id, the 
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unqonscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987); 
Lopez, The Work We Know So Little About, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1989); Matsuda, Public Response 
1763 
1764 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1763 
I would bend pragmatism toward liberation in three ways: First, I 
would weight the pragmatic method to identify and give special credence 
to the perspective of the subordinated; second, I would add a first princi-
ple of anti-subordination;4 and third, I would claim that the use of prag-
matic method with a nonnative first principle is not inconsistent. This 
essay will address each of these modifications and respond to a range of 
false consciousness and essentialism critiques that are implicated by the 
concept of subordination. 
II. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE SUBORDINATED 
As a method, pragmatism is attractive to subordinated people 
because it is often their indigenous method. Pragmatism recognizes mul-
tiple consciousness,S experimentation, and flexibility as tools of inquiry. 
These are tools well known to poor women who live the refrain "and still 
I rise,,6 as they adapt their strategies of daily living to meet the historical 
moment at which the wrong choice can mean going without the necessi-
ties of life. Professors Minow and Spelman in their exposition of the 
concept of context honor this rising.7 
Arguing for attention to the perspective of poor women is more than 
arguing for one-woman-one-vote. Pragmatism becomes impoverished 
pluralism if its only message is, "Consider all points of view." Rectifica-
tion of historical injustice, of historical devoicing, requires a weighted 
pragmatic method. Listening long and hard to less privileged voices is 
restitutional, reparational, rectifying, and reconstructive. It is the anti-
dote to what Professor Radin calls bad coherence:8 the situated knowl-
edge of the golden few. 
If our goal as scholars and ethical beings is to know as much as we 
ean about the human condition so as to improve the prospects of good 
to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989); Torres, Local 
Knowledge, Local Color: Critical Legal Studies and the Law 0/ Race Relations, 25 SAN DJI!GO L. 
REv. 1043 (1988); Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals/rom Deconstructed Rights, 22 
HARv. C.R.·C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987); R. WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL 
THOUGHT (1990). 
4. See Colker, Anti·Subordination Above All: Sex, Race and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 1003 (1986) (one author's statement of the anti·subordination principle). See also West, Pr0-
gressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REv. 641 (1990) (discussing anti·subordi· 
nation politics and instrumental uses of law). 
5. See Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential 
Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 7 (1989). 
6. See M. ANGELOU, AND STILL I RIsE (1978). 
7. Minow & Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1597 (1990). 
8. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699, 1710 (1990). 
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lives for all of us, our task of retrieval is monumental and continual.9 
Asking "Who is not in this room and why are they not here?" whenever 
we gather to form theory is part of this retrieval.!O We can ask this ques-
tion literally and intellectually. We can question the physical absence, 
for example, of openly gay and lesbian scholars. We can question as well 
their intellectual absence. What would a critique of pragmatism that 
accounted for heterosexist assumptions look like, and how are we as the-
oreticians impoverished by the absence in the literature of such a cri-
tique?!! These are the kinds of questions that initiate retrieval. 
Here the exasperated challenge suggests itself: when will she be sat-
isfied, when will all this talk about excluded voices end, and when will 
the excluded accept the fact that they are now members of the club, so 
that we can get on with the conversation that was interrupted when they 
knocked on the door?!2 The project of retrieval ends when the problem 
of bad coherence ends. It is hard to accept a task of rectification that 
promises no close reward. Bad coherence requires active and near-per-
petual retrieval of subordinated perspectives because of the nature of 
power. Power at its peak is so quiet and obvious in its place of seized 
truth that it becomes, simply, truth rather than power. 
Catharine MacKinnon said, "[T]he worse and more systematic 
one's mistreatment is, the more it seems justified. Liberalism has a 
regard for power that never sees it, yet sees only it. It never sees power as 
power, yet can see as significant only that which power does."!3 While 
Radin suggests the possibility of bad coherence, MacKinnon suggests its 
inevitability. Whether located in a structure (like patriarchy) or in an 
9. Our task is monumental because of a cultural and political legacy that has denied the 
capacity for thought and the right of public voice to subordinated groups. See White, Subordination, 
Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFFALO L. REv. 
1 (1990) (discussing the denial oflega! capacity, including competency to testify, to white women as 
well as men and women of color). Our task is continual because we will not achieve a world free 
from all forms of domination until lifetimes of struggle have passed. 
10. The evidence mounts that we also need to ask, "Of those here, who is not speaking and 
why?" See id., at 20-21 (discussing evidence that "women and other subordinated groups do not in 
fact participate in legal proceedings as frequently or as fluently as socially dominant groups"); see 
also D. TANNEN, You JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN IN CoNVERSATION (1990) 
(discussing gender barriers to communication). 
11. For the emerging analysis of heterosexism in law, see, e.g., Gomez, The Public Expression 
of Lesbian-Gay Personhood as Protected Speech, 1983 Law & Inequality 121; Halley, The Politics of 
the Closet: Towards Equal Protectionfor Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915 
(1989). 
12. This query is implicit in the parade of academic bestsellers that lament the passing of the 
old canon. 
13. C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 2, at 221 (emphasis in original). 
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individual Qike the radical lawyer attempting to use a conservative sys-
tem of law), 14 the push toward coherence, toward reproduction of certain 
beliefs and truths, is strong. If pragmatists wish to take seriously the 
possible truth offered by marginalized people, a weak neutrality in listen-
ing is not enough. The centrifugal force of dominant culture is not 
resisted by standing still. 
In my work I strive to learn from those who have access to a world I 
do not know, a world I cannot hope to imagine in full and telling detail.1s 
A reading of theorists like MacKinnon is valuable because it reveals sex-
ual hierarchy and suggests theoretical structure. It cannot, and does not, 
pretend to suggest the lived detail of every person touched by that struc-
ture, the thousandfold moments of adaptation, resistance, agony, and 
agency that breathe life into theory and declare it true or false. Reading 
the theory of patriarchy cannot tell me of Darlene Leach, the Appalach-
ian woman who recounts: 
I hauled coal when I was pregnant, and my sister and I have loaded 
and unloaded coal with a shovel with a six-month-old baby lying 
asleep between us. I have cut paper wood to buy the baby the 
medicine she needed and sold berries to buy clothes for an unborn 
baby. 16 
As this woman tells of her life, she tells of her strategies of survival 
and of her dream of dignity. She describes getting married at fifteen to 
escape poverty; she tells of her husband's alcoholism and violence. In the 
midst of physical abuse, she says, "I got to where I felt like I was abso-
lutely nothing. I didn't want to face people or talk with them because I 
was so ashamed .... I didn't think I had any brains at all. I was com-
pletely alone in the world."17 
Eventually, Ms. Leach sought help from a women's collective, and 
she divorced her husband. He begged her to come back, and eventually 
he quit drinking. She explains: 
[M]y religion said I should take him back. plus we were desperate for 
money, and he was working, so, finally, I said I would take him back 
14. For a personal recounting of this danger, see Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for 
Equality o/Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 295 (1988). 
15. See Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in Plowed-up 
Ground, 11 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 1 (1988) (discussing specific methods for retrieving absent per-
spectives in legal scholarship). 
16. F. Buss, DIGNITY 130 (1985). 
17. [d. at 137. 
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and we remarried .... Virgil has not drank or hurt me or the children 
physically since I remarried him, but he has hurt us emotionally.1S 
1767 
Ms. Leach says her confidence has grown through her association 
with the women's collective. The purpose of the Mountain Women's 
exchange, she says, is "to help women to not be pushed back into the 
corner like some kind of animal that's afraid to move or a little mouse 
that is afraid to stick its head out from under.,,19 
This story is a complex one of a woman surviving poverty and patri-
archy, sometimes resisting, sometimes acquiescing, sometimes knowing, 
sometimes deceiving herself. This woman teaches about change in struc-
tures of domination: it was her credible threat to leave her batterer that 
ended his physical abuse. Positive change in oppressive relationships is 
almost always initiated by the victim. But there is danger in initiating 
change. Women are sometimes killed when they attempt to leave their 
batterers.2o Change is risk. I have so much to learn from women like • 
Darlene Leach, women unschooled in the academic sense and well 
schooled in the living sense. Yet nearly everything in my own academic 
schooling has told me that her voice is not theory and that I have nothing 
to learn from her?1 
18. Id. at 141. 
19. Id. at 144. 
20. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 43 STAN. 
L. REv. (1991) (forthcoming). 
21. Adrienne Rich wrote of this lie in her essay Notes Toward a Politics of Location: 
In my white North American world they have tried to tell me that this woman-politicized 
by intersecting forces--doesn't think and reflect on her life. That her ideas are not real 
ideas like those of Karl Marx and Simone de Beauvoir. That her calculations, her spiritual 
philosophy, her gifts for law and ethics, her daily emergency politieal decisions are merely 
instinctual or conditioned reactions. That only certain kinds of people can make theory; 
that the educated mind is capable offormulating everything; that white middle-class femi-
nism can know for "all women"; that only when a white mind formulates is the formula-
tion to be taken seriously. 
A. RICH, BLOOD, BREAD, AND POETRY 230 nn.1, 17a (1986). Barbara Christian offered a related 
observation: 
[p]eople of color have always theorized .•. often in narrative forms, in the stories we 
create, in riddles and proverbs, in the play of language, because dynamic rather than fix-
ated ideas seem more to our liking. How else have we managed to survive with such 
spiritedness the assault on our bodies, social institutions, countries, our very humanity? 
Christian, The Racefor Theory, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 67, 68 (1988). Christian's celebration of organic 
theory contrasts with Rorty's suggestion that the language of victims is obsolete and difficult to 
replace. R. RORTY, CoNTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989). Allan Hutchinson suggests 
the colonial nature of this observation in his review of Rorty's work. See Hutchinson, The Three 
'Rs': Reading, RoTty, RadicaIIy, 103 HARV. L. REv. 555 (1989). 
Views like Christian's, on the other hand, are sometimes called "anti-intellectual" or ''balkaniz-
ing." I hope to do the work of theory in a way that is neither anti-intellectual nor exclusionary. 
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It is a lie that there is no knowledge, no theory, no eloquence among 
the poor. Scholars like Fran Buss, who recorded the story of Darlene 
Leach, along with the stories of other low-income women, have called 
out that lie. Pragmatic method is enriched, I believe, by weighting it to 
retrieve subordinated voices in order to attain a truer account of social 
reality and human possibilities. 
III. JUSTICE AS AN END 
In a world of radical inequality, relativist resignation reinforces the 
status quo. 
-Mary Hawkesworth22 
In addition to suggesting weighted pragmatism as method, I suggest 
rectification of past injustice and elimination of all present forms of sub-
ordination as first principles. Pragmatic method suggests plural, provi-
sional, and emergent truths. It is skeptical of universalized experience 
and absolute description. 
There is a difference, however, between cultural relativism and ethi-
cal relativism.23 This relates to Professor Putnam's reading of Dewey. 24 
"Anything is possible" is not the same as "anything goes." The emphasis 
on context and provisional truth does not remove the obligation to divide 
right from wrong and to retain justice as the goal of theory. 
It is aesthetically and instrumentally ineffective to talk of homeless-
ness as maybe, possibly, or probably unjust. The loss to me is more than 
tactical. It is above all a loss of the soul. To call justice claims "possibly 
true" does disservice to our deepest longings and degrades the courage of 
human beings who risk all for a vision of justice. In this, I side with 
Professor Coruel West's quest for a prophetic pragmatism,2S one that 
hears the human plea for decent lives. 
22. Hawkesworth, Knowers, Knowing, Known: Feminist Theory and Claims of Troth, in M. 
MALsON, J. Q'BARR, S. WESTPHAL-WIHL & M. WYER, FEMINIST THEORY IN PRACI'ICE & PRO-
CESS 351 (1989). 
23. I thank Professor Renato RosaIdo for suggesting this distinction. Another writer who has 
struggled with this distinction is Robin West, who suggests that both relativism and objectivity are, 
at the extreme, useless to lawyers concerned with justice. She concludes, "At a minimum, the judge 
(or lawyer) who performs well-who is responsive to both the authoritarian danger of objectivist 
thought and the quietist danger of relativism-has a heightened sensitivity to the plight of others-
particularly the silenced, the outsider, and the subordinate." West, Relativism, Objectivity, and Law, 
99 YALE LJ. 1473, 1502 (1990). 
24. Putnam, A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1671 (1990). 
25. C. WEST, PROPHETIC PRAGMATISM (1988). 
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The seeming contradiction between the critique of objectivity and 
the critique of present injustice is well known to feminists and critical 
race theorists. 26 Various "social construction" theories and the 
unmasking of "white male SUbjectivity" form an emerging theme in the 
academy.27 Critiques suggesting the contingency of knowledge and the 
way in which dominant conceptions of knowledge support existing ine-
qualities of power resonate for people who identify with the powerless. 
The powerless, however, have always relied on claims of objective 
truth and on the use of existing structures of knowledge to critique domi-
nant society on its own terms.28 Can one deconstruct law and use law at 
the same time? Critical race scholars have suggested this is possible.29 
Pragmatists are plagued by an analogous dilemma. The common 
caricature of pragmatism as the religion of the perpetually skeptical and 
the morality of the avowedly amoral reflects this. Where is the line at 
which "all truths are provisional" leaves humility and enters cynicism? 
I believe it is here: pragmatism as a method is valuable as a method 
to an end, and the end of all human striving is justice. To have a goal as 
ambitious and grand as justice counsels equally ambitious humility, lest 
26. For a sampling of the rich feminist literature on this subject, see, e.g., s. HARDING, THE 
SCIENCE QUBSTION IN FEMINISM (1986); Haraway, Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in 
Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 575 (1988); Hawkesworth, 
supra note 22. For one author's perspective on objectivist legal claims and racial subordination, see 
Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REv. 323 (1987). 
27. See Crenshaw, Toward a Race Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK 
L.J. 1, 3 (1989) ("[L]aw school discourse proceeds with the expectation that students will learn to 
perform the standard mode of legal reasoning and embrace its presrunption of perspective1ess-
ness. • .• [W]hat is understood as objeetive or neutral is often the embodiment of a white middle-
class world view."); Rosaldo, Others of Invention, Ethnicity and Its Discontents, 82 VOICE LITERARY 
SUPPLEMENT 27 (1990) (offering a complexified analysis of "invention of" and social construction 
theories). Leslie Wahl Rabine writes of the need for feminists to remain both post-structuralists in 
theory and situated critics in political practice: 
If the metaphysical oppositions and the imposing of a single phallocentric truth can be 
oppressive ••. bottomless deconstructive strategies can in certain situations be equally so. 
The deconstruction of metaphysical oppositions always takes place in a context of social 
hierarchy •••. Whether this play is progressive depends on who does it to whom, what is 
its historic or institutional context, and who makes the rules. 
Rabine, A Feminist Polities of Non-Identity, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 11, 28 (1988). 
28. See Rosaldo, supra note 27. 
29. See, e.g., Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REv. 1 (1987). Feminists also struggle with this dilemma. See, e.g., Fmley, Breaking Women's 
Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. 
REv. 886 (1989) (discussing the difficulty of using male-centered legal language to attain feminist 
ends). 
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grand goals become the excuse for ignorance and inhumanity. Pragma-
tism is ambitious in its humility, a humility born of the chilling history of 
mistakes made in the name of Truth. 
The pragmatist says, "Listen hard. Consider all possibilities. In 
meeting other cultures and world views, try to know them and to enter 
them before judging them." The anthropologist Renato Rosaldo tells us 
of his fieldwork with the Ilongot headhunters.3o At first he could not 
understand their explanation for the practice of headhunting. It was, 
they said, what they needed to expunge raging grief at the loss of a loved 
one. The headhunters were equally perplexed by the American anthro-
pologist's draft notice. "How can one man order another man into bat-
tle?" they asked,3l This was completely foreign to the Ilongot sense of 
the humanly possible. 
In telling this story, Rosaldo attempts to demonstrate cultural speci-
ficity and the separate truths of separate groups. We can never purport 
to know another culture fully, he says, or to set aside fully our own 
assumptions in order to study another's. The anthropologist's humility 
suggests cultural relativism: there is more than one way to organize life 
and politics, and we should not judge before we understand. 
It has been my privilege to teach with Professor Rosaldo, and I 
know from both his teaching and his lived practice that he is not an 
ethical relativist. He is a person who will make great sacrifices for the 
moral positions to which he is committed. Somewhere in the process of 
approaching other cultures and possible truths with great humility, he 
has found the moral truth he lives by and the moral courage to act. 
The anthropologist's humility toward culture and the pragmatist's 
humility toward theory need not exist in a moral vacuum. Individually 
and collectively, we face unavoidable choices that implicate our survival. 
The method of holding truth provisional can encourage knowing more 
and thinking harder so that when we make the difficult choices, we are at 
our best. The method of holding truth provisional does not, for me, 
mean there is no truth, no justice. 
We can live better lives than we live now. Certainly the growing 
numbers of impoverished children can live better lives than they live 
now. This is imperative. At the end of our theoretical struggle is some-
one's life. 
30. R. ROSALDO, CuLTURE AND TRUTH (1989). 
31. [d. 
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Real people and their needs create the outside normative position 
from which I measure the legal strategies derived from pragmatic 
method: Does the strategy help dismantle structures of subordination? 
Does it feed the children and keep the bombs from falling? Does it heed 
the jagged edges of human pain, the soaring places of human desire? If it 
does not, I cannot risk its use. 
IV. NORMATIVE PRAGMATISM AND CONTRADICTION 
Relieving anxiety is not the object of academic work. 
-Gayatri Spivak32 
Third, and last, I suggest the plausibility of a normative notion of 
pragmatism. The perceived dichotomy between pragmatic method and 
normative absolutes is the place where I live and do my legal work and 
from which I take my strength. This is not a paralyzing contradiction to 
me. I will put forward the anti-subordination principle as a likely candi-
date for transcendental status and sign on to the pragmatism that is an 
urgent search for humane political practices. This is how I work, and it 
feels real and noncontradictory. 
The binary, either-or thinking that favors arithmetic exactitude 
challenges us to choose sides. "Is law and liberation an oxymoron?" a 
group of law students asked recently. A range of legal thinkers 
answered, in a variety of styles, "not necessarily," resisting the push 
always to choose when faced with a contradiction.33 
In advocating legal restrictions of racist speech, I had the familiar 
feeling of trying to walk, not crawl, on a narrow ridge between two 
chasms.34 "Choose an anti-racist or a free speech agenda," was the chal-
lenge I heard, and I tried to respond, "I will not choose to abandon one 
of two principles when both are necessary for my survival." 
Neither will I choose between commitment to an anti-subordination 
morality and commitment to the truth-seeking method of pragmatism. 
At some point the path along the ridgeway may narrow, and I may have 
to choose. But I am not there yet, so I hope to stay in the pragmatist's 
32. Quoted in Barringer, The Mainstreaming of Marxism in u.s. Colleges, N.Y. Times, Oct. 
25, 1989, at B7. 
33. Is Law & Liberation an Oxymoron?, 1 YALE J. L. & LIBERATION 1 (1989). 
34. See Matsuda, supra note 3. For similar efforts, see Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go, 
1990 DUKE LJ. - (forthcoming); Delgado, Words That Wound, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 
(1982). 
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conversation, drawing strength from the whirlwind place we call 
contradiction.35 
V. CRITIQUE OF PRAGMATISM MODIFIED 
A. ANTI-EsSENTIALISM 
How does one affirm that the world is made, not given, and still recog-
nize the weight and force with which socially constructed factors 
impinge on human lives? 
-Renato Resald036 
The version of pragmatism suggested here invites critique. First, as 
Judge Posner has suggested, the oppressed/oppressor dichotomy creates 
problems of identification.37 Subordination is a dynamic, not a static, 
relationship.38 Structures of domination overlap and merge. The parties 
in a given dyad of domination can change places, depending on context. 
Oppression itself is interactive, as Hegel knew.39 In response to this com-
plexified and processual understanding of subordination, we have two 
choices: We can throw up our hands and say, "Everyone's oppressed. 
How can we know who to listen to if the charge is to listen to the 
oppressed?" Or we can say, as I do, that we live in a material, knowable 
world and that, while oppression is a complex notion, we can walk 
through the streets of our cities and bear witness to its existence. We can 
walk as anthropologists amid our own culture, attempting to describe the 
full complexity of its structures of subordination. 
35. For Alice Walker on contradiction, see A. WALKER, REVOLUTIONARY PETUNIAS AND 
OTHER POEMS 31 (1971). ("Be nobody's darling;/Be an outcastlTake the contradictions/Of your 
life/And wrap aroundIYou like a shawl,lTo parry stoneslTo keep you warm."); for Gwendolyn 
Brooks on whirlwind, see G. BROOKS, The Second Sermon on the Warpland, in BLACKS 456 (1989) 
("It is lonesome, yes. For we are the last of the loud. Nevertheless, live. Conduct your blooming in 
the noise and whip of the whirlwind."). I read these poets' embrace of whirlwind and contradiction 
as a womanist echo of the refined statement of Wallace Stevens's metaphor described in Professor 
Grey's analysis. See Grey, Hear the Other Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal Theory, 63 S. 
CAL L. REv. 1569 (1990) (discussing the paradox ofperspectivism and quoting Stevens's choice of 
"the whole,lThe Complicate, the amassing harmony"). See also D. Trubek, Back to the Future: 
The Short, Happy Life of the Law and Society Movement 77·78 (April 1990) (Institute for Legal 
Studies, Working Papers Series No.4) (on "[I]iving in the contradiction ••• " oflegal indeterminacy 
and the need for normative argument). 
36. Rosaldo, supra note 27, at 27. 
37. Posner, What Has Pragmatism To Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1653, 1659 (1990). 
38. I've learned this from the students who have been brave enough to tell me when they feel 
subordinated in my classes. My thanks to them for their teaching. 
39. See G. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT (1807), discussed in Thomas, A House 
Divided Against Itself: A Comment on "Mastery, Slavery, and Emancipation," 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 
1481 (1989). 
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Both within and without subordinated communities the group iden-
tity question is a significant one. Rather than gloss over the problem, we 
should ask for more critical thought about its subparts, including (1) the 
problem of dynamic relations within aq.d among groups, (2) the problem 
of multiple identity or what Kimberle Crenshaw terms intersectionality, 
(3) the various anti-essentialism critiques,40 and (4) the question of self-
determination or who decides when a group is a groUp.41 
A magician makes a rabbit disappear with deft hands and sympa-
thetic lighting. An intellectual makes the category "rabbit" disappear by 
selective inspection of its constituent parts. There are, obviously, other 
small furry animals that are not rabbits. There are pop cultural icons 
like Bugs Bunny; there are jackrabbits racing planes down rural Califor-
nia runways, and there are rabbit legs in stews in Parisian restaurants. 
There is the rabbit associated with fertility in European culture and the 
rabbit who lives on the moon in Asian culture. What, then, is the rabbit? 
The other side to this kind of playful deconstruction is the recogni-
tion that categories count. They count in naming the structure of 
"racism" or "patriarchy" and suggesting a category, "women of color," 
impacted by both. Categories count in calling attention to social facts, in 
organizing for social change. They count tragically, in determining who 
gets shot in the back while running from the police in the night in Louis-
ville, Kentucky.42 
Categorization is not antithetical to recognizing movement either 
within a structure or within a category.43 That is, in creating the cate-
gory ''women of color," we can recognize changes and interactions 
within the category. Some women of color are strongly identified with 
the category, and others have not given it a thought. Some have given it 
thought and have chosen to reject the category. Some reject the name, 
and others reject the status and "pass" as white women. Class status, for 
some women of color, may determine the course of their lives more 
surely than does either race or gender. 
40. By "anti-essentialism" I mean the critique that challenges the notion that there is a distilla-
ble essence that characterizes a particular subset of human beings, such as women. See, e.g., Harris, 
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990). 
41. See infra note 51. 
42. Youth of Newburg, a group of Afriean-American teenagers from Louisville, Kentucky, 
reported to the 10th National Convention of the National Alliance Against Racist and Political 
Repression that their friend Jay Lewis was shot in the back while running from the police. Jay 
Lewis's crime, the Youth of Newburg concluded, their voices loud in the cadences of rap, was "being 
black," and I believe them. 
43. For a discussion of this theme, see R.M. UNGER, POLmcs: A WORK IN CoNSTRUCTIVE 
SOCIAL THEORY (1987). Unger would neither deny structure, nor deny its elasticity. 
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Movement within the category is joined by movement without. 
Men of color, white men, and white women are in varying relations to 
the category "women of color," relations that will change over time and 
that will manifest themselves in a range of outcomes in individual cases. 
Some white women will have close peer relationships with women of 
color. Others will not. 
This dynamic quality of intragroup and intergroup relations does 
not necessarily destroy the intellectual power of group categorization. In 
fact, it can reinforce it. A category of analysis becomes useful when, 
understood in its full complexity and revealed in its exceptions and 
counterexamples, it helps us to know more than we would have known 
otherwise. 
To clarify: a category like "women of color" is useful if thinking 
about that category tells us more about the workings of racism and patri-
archy than we would know if we did all of our thinking without that 
category. A pragmatic approach to the problem of group identity might 
be to say that, even if we do not know how useful a group analysis will 
be, we can consider the classification provisionally, asking what it adds to 
our thinking. Considering the category "women of color," we might ask, 
as Professor Crenshaw has, whether the analysis of the point at which 
racism and patriarchy intersect is an analysis that can help us know and 
dismantle those structures of domination.44 
In analyzing intersectionality, Professor Crenshaw shows that one 
person can have multiple group identities. Rather than using this to end 
the conversation about group status, she uses it as a beginning. Neither 
an anti-racist nor an anti-patriarchal critique of law is completely satisfy-
ing to her.4s The partial critique becomes a fuller critique by standing at 
the intersection and from there embarking on the lawyer's task of analyz-
ing Supreme Court decisions. 
Professor Crenshaw avoids the simplistic anti-essentialism that 
deconstructs subordinated group identity until subordination no longer 
seems to exist. There is a certain sophisticated attraction to the critique 
44. Professor Crenshaw says, "Placing those who currently are marginalized in the center is 
the most effective way to resist efforts to compartmentalize experience and undermine potential col-
lective action." Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL 
FORUM 139, 167. See also A. DAVIS, WOMEN, CULTURE & POLmcs (1989) (discussing an inter-
connected understanding of all forms of oppression). 
45. She discusses criticism of Title VII doctrine, rape, separate sphere ideology, and cultural 
explanations of black poverty as inadequate without an intersectional analysis. Crenshaw, supra 
note 44, at 146-50, 157-59, 164-65. 
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that says something like, "All women could not possibly share the same 
experience of subordination; therefore, gender-based cultural claims are 
vulgar and diversionary." A similar critique of race as a category of 
analysis is also in vogue.46 
Anti-essentialism critiques have multiple geneses. First is the strong 
liberal tradition of formal equality under which the best defense against 
subordination is to argue that "all people are the same." Categorizing-
for instance, calling attention to Japanese-American cultural identity-is 
threatening when assimilation and equal citizenship claims are survival 
tools for the categorized community. 
Second is the simple truth of the critique. Of course no two people 
within a category will share the same experience, and no structure will 
consistently and directly produce a predictable outcome. Life is too won-
drously complex for that. 
Third is a faith in human agency and a pragmatic distrust of finality 
in categorization. If woman is defined as victim, how will she be any-
thing but that?47 If African-Americans call attention to their distinctive 
culture, how can they resist blame-the-culture explanations of African-
American economic disadvantage?48 The courageous ascendence up and 
out of subordinated status that some individuals attain is celebrated and 
taken as further evidence of the falsity of the classification.49 
46. See Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia. 102 HARV. L. REv. 1745 (1989). In my 
work I have attempted to identify a critical theory oflaw that derives from the experience of people 
of color. In doing this, I have carefully noted that not all people of color have the same experience, 
either within a specific group or as between groups. I have also avoided claiming that only people of 
color can attain critical consciousness of race, claiming, in fact, quite the opposite. See Matsuda, 
supra note 5. In spite of this qualification, certain readers have insisted on misstating my thesis as 
"reading out from chromosomes and physiognomy." DiLeornado & Reed, Letter to the Editor, 
Nation, Oct. 23, 1989, at 442. Writers like Professor Kennedy have insisted on restating my work as 
essentialist, even after the qualifying statements were called to his attention. See, e.g., M. Matsuda, 
Remarks at Law Profs Fight the Power, Stanford Law School Panel Discussion (Nov. 17, 1989) 
(nnpublished). This insistence indicates a psychological need for the essentialist bugaboo: why have 
the critics created an essentialist voice where there is none? Mere clarity of thought does not require 
the frantic retreat that seems to accompany any suggestion that, at this historical juncture, racial 
status tends to generate certain generally discernible experiences. For another example of the need 
to create and then trash essentialist arguments, see Will, Academic Set-Asides, Washington Post, 
May 17, 1990, at A27. Will attacks a theory that "all black scholars have had 'experiences' that give 
them unique 'perspectives' that whites are not qualified to question." ld. I am not aware of anyone 
who has made the argument that Will attacks. 
47. See Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male 
Battering of Women, 1989 U. au. LEGAL FORUM 23. 
48. For a discussion and critique of cultural inferiority claims, see Lawrence, supra note 34. 
49. In this sense, one of the earliest and most poignant American anti-essentialist tracts was 
Booker T. Washington's Up From Slavery, which extols self-reliance and hard work as the key to 
proving blacks are as good as whites. B.T. WASillNGTON, Up FROM SLAVERY (1901). 
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Finally, the categories threaten people because positioning people in 
structures of subordination implicates all of us. It denies random and 
individual explanations of who we are and what our responsibilities are 
to others. If there is patriarchy, and if that is the reason men earn a 
dollar to women's sixty-five cents, what does that mean about a man's 
claim that he earned his paycheck?50 If there is homophobia that coerces 
people into heterosexual relationships, what does that mean about the 
last time she, a straight woman, "fell in love"? If there is a category 
called Native Americans with valid unredressed claims to treaty viola-
tions, how can we say that ours is a nation oflaws?51 Ifwe pick apart the 
categories we necd not answer these questions. 
Decategorizing is more than an intellectual game. It has a politics 
and a set of consequences: When the Mashpee Tribe raised land claims, 
the legal issue of treaty rights was never reached because the court 
decided the Mashpee were no longer IndianS.52 Should we create and 
retain categories that explore relationships of privilege and subordina-
tion, and if so, whose claims to categorization deserve primacy? The 
concept of self-determination encompasses the human right to define the 
self. My choice in looking at a group of which I am not a member is to 
grant particular weight to that group's internal process for identifying 
group membership. 53 That is my starting point. Beyond that, I turn 
again to pragmatism and the anti-subordination goal. I do not know 
how we can end subordination without talking about it, studying it, and 
naming it in all its forms. We must conceputalize, albeit with provisional 
humility, the structures of subordination. 
As we do this, we can remember that no two people experience the 
world exactly alike and that this asymmetry mUltiplies geometrically 
when we generalize to the level of groups. Complexity is not the same as 
chaos. No two snowflakes are alike, but when it is snowing, it is cold 
outside. There are parallels and intersections in the maze of complex 
50. See Blau, Trends in Earning of Women and Minorities, 41 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 547 
(1988); Carlson & Swartz, The Earnings of Women and Ethnic Minorities, 1959-1979, 41 IND. & 
LAB. REL. REv. 530 (1988); Shack-Marqnez, Earnings Differences Between Men and Women: An 
Introductory Note, MONTHLY LAB. REv., June 1984, at 15. 
51. See R. WILLIAMS, supra note 3. 
52. See J. CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TwENTIETH-CENTURY ETHNOGRA-
PHY, LITERATURE & ART 277 (1988). 
53. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 26, at 387 (discussing the right of native Hawaiians to deter-
mine who is Hawaiian for purposes of obtaining reparations for the illegal overthrow of the Hawai-
ian monarchy). See also Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal 
Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 671 (1989) (exploring complexities of tribal membership); Trask, Politics 
in the Pacific Islands: Imperialism and Native Self-Determination (1989) (unpublished manuscript). 
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structures that are the human condition. Knowing one structure of sub-
ordination makes it easier to know another. We are not the same. But 
we are not so different that we are bereft of the chance of knowing any-
thing at all about one another and thereby about ourselves. 
B. FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS 
The next, related objection to a discourse of the subordinated is, as 
Professor Brewer suggested, that even if we identify subordinated groups 
there is no guarantee that they have anything valuable to say about sub-
ordination. 54 This is the "false consciousness" problem. Various phe-
nomena, such as working-class authoritarianism, Asian-American 
homophobia, and women's interualization of patriarchal body images, 
show how subordination can obscure as well as illuminate self-knowl-
edge. 55 The long, cold history of subordinated status generating subordi-
nating impulses is well known to both scholars and targets of recycled 
hate.56 
The subordinated are not always the source of wisdom the Seven 
Samurai seek when they ride into the village to save the starving peas-
ants. What the Seven Samurai found were people ugly, hungry, tired, 
and, above all, untrustworthy. 57 The filmmaker, I would add, was more 
a samurai than a peasant.58 Did he find what he was looking for? 
Even if the poor are noble and wise, it is suggested, they may be 
inarticulate and incapable of sharing what they know. 59 Their knowl-
edge may not exist in any container they can pass to us. Instead of being 
known to them as knowledge, it may simply be "the way things are." 
When I have argued in the past that legal theorists should seek out 
subordinated voices, I have heard in response a regiment of reasons why 
54. Here I acknowledge Professor Brewers clarification in the comment period. See 
Afterword, 63 s. CAL. L. REv. 1911, 1911 (1990). I thank him for the engaged and non-elitist tone 
of his critique. 
55. Feminists attempt to deal with internalized oppression through the method of conscious-
ness-raising. See, e.g., E. BALKIN, M. PRArr & B. SMITH, YOURS IN STRUGGLE (1984). 
56. See, e.g., H. SHAPIRO, WHITE VIOLENCE AND BLACK REsPONSE: FROM REcONSTRUC-
TION TO MONTGOMERY (1988). 
57. A. KUROSAWA, SHICHININ NO SAMURAI (THE SEVEN SAMURAI) (1954). See D. DESSER, 
THE SAMURAI FILMS OF AKIRA KUROSAWA 78 (1983) (discussing the relationship between the 
farmers and the samurai in The Seven Samurai). 
58. See D. DESSER, supra note 57. 
59. The Native American poet Paula Gunn Allen wrote the following: "No easy matter-to 
simply write what happens now, or then. It is beyond me on ordinary days to acknowledge what I 
know and what I see. I was carefully constructed to forget what is before my eyes." P. ALLEN, 
WYRDS 51 (1987). 
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this search would prove pointless, ranging from "We already know what 
they have to say," to "It does them disservice to romanticize their posi-
tion," to "Their immersion in their own subordination taints their 
analysis." 
My personal and unscientific suspicion is that there can be false con-
sciousness about false consciousness.6O There is a strong incentive for 
academics to believe that poor and working people have little of value to 
say about law, social life, or politics. How could we justify gathering at 
meetings like the Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in 
American Legal Thought so graciously sponsored by the University of 
Southern California, if indeed it is true that important information, the-
ory, and imagination are possessed by people whom we never invite to 
our conferences? 
In addition to this possible bias, we must also consider the record 
that reveals that subordinated people do make history, particularly when 
their political practice gives them a consciousness of their position. 
Workers claimed the eight-hour day; women claimed suffrage; African-
Americans claimed access to public accommodations. In the academy, 
similar claiming has changed the institutions of knowledge production. 
There were white women, people of color, and women of color at the 
USC Symposium on neopragmatism. This happened not by chance, but 
by a consciousness of exclusion and demands for inclusion that 
originated outside the academy. 
False consciousness is a real phenomenon that we must understand 
and for which we must account. It exists in tandem with critical con-
sciousness, with the power of the subordinated to understand subordina-
tion and to derive means of liberation from it. 
Thus, if we are to weight pragmatism so that it attends to the per-
spective of the subordinated, the challenge is to identify the particular 
voice refined by consciousness-raising.61 By "consciousness-raising," I 
60. A writer criticizing a positivist social scientist's survey research on Korean-American 
entrepreneurs argues against empiricism and for analysis of "the social world from a critical perspec-
tive •.. eugag[ing] with people in helping them to see how hegemonic ideologies dominate their 
uuderstanding of their own experience." Bonacich, The Role of the Petite Bourgeoisie Within Capi-
talism: A Response to Pyong Gap Min, 15 AMERASIA 195, 200 (1989). She opens her critique, how-
ever, by admitting that the empiricist-a Korean-Ameriean-"obviously has a far more intimate 
knowledge of the Korean community than I." ld. at 195. It troubled me to read in her critique an 
assumption of false consciousness coupled with an admission that the Korean-American researcher 
"has a kind of hands on knowledge that I lack." ld. at 199. 
61. Korstad & Lichtenstein, Opportunities Found and Lost: Lobor, Radicals, and the Early 
Civil Rights Movement, 75 J. OF AMER. HIST. 786 (discassing the 1940's civil rights movement, 
which organized in coalition with the labor movement). 
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mean a collective practice of searching for self-knowledge through close 
examination of our own circumstances, in conjunction with organized 
movements to end existing conditions of domination. 
Human beings engaged in this kind of work have overcome self-hate 
and limited beliefs about life's possibilities. They have learned to listen to 
others and to confront their own role in maintaining subordination. 
Through this process women have learned to leave batterers, and batter-
ers have learned why they are so angry. Mrican-Americans have learned 
they could demand voting rights, and Japanese-Americans have learned 
they were not crazy to demand an apology for the wrong of World War 
II internment.62 Students have learned they can link oppressions and 
fight racism, sexism, homophobia, militarism, class oppression, environ-
mental degradation, and all forms of subordination in the unprecedented 
coalition that will be known to history as the great student movement of 
the 1990s. Workers have learned that racism and sexism are the first 
clubs to hit the shop when a union drive begins; they have learned-in 
those progressive moments in labor history when unity defeated race and 
sex privilege-that all benefit from the elimination of all forms of 
oppression.63 
My search is for these moments of knowing. While I want to listen 
to all economically disadvantaged people, I want to listen with special 
care to the miners at the Pittston coalfields who are organizing in a way 
that gives them knowledge about their class position.64 While I want to 
listen to all women, I want to listen especially well to women who work 
62. For discussions of coming to critical conscionsness in the African-American civil rights 
movements, see S. CLARK, READy FROM WITHIN: SEPTIMA CLARK AND THE CIvIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT (1986). In this work, veteran activist Septima Clark describes her failed efforts to get 
African-American school teachers to support her when she was fired from her South Carolina teach-
ing position because of membership in the NAACP: 
I don't know why I felt that the black teachers would stand up for their rights. But they 
wouldn't. Most of them were afraid and became hostile ..•. 
I considered that one of the failures of my life because I think that I tried to push them into 
something that they weren't ready for. From that day on I say, "I'm going to have to get 
the people trained. We're going to have to show them the dangers or the pitfalls that they 
are in, before they will accept." And it took many years. 
ld. at 37-38. Testimony and oral history of Japanese-Americans played a critical role in the redress 
movement. Cf. J. TATEISHI, AND JUsrICE FOR ALL: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE AMER-
ICAN DETENTION CAMPS (1984). 
63. Cf. M. CoNWAY, RIsE GONNA RIsE: A PORTRAIT OF SOUTHERN TEXTILE WORKERS 
119 (1979) (discussing racism as a union-busting tactic). For discussion of successful anti-racist, 
multi-racial organizing strategies, see, e.g., E. BEECHERT, WORKING IN HAWAII: A LABOR HIS-
TORY (1985) (discussing unity tactics of the International Longshoreman and Warehouseman's 
Union). 
64. See Mills, Solidarity in Virginia, DISSENT, Spring 1990, at 237. 
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in battered women's shelters, who have knowledge about the dynamics of 
patriarchy.65 While I want to listen to all Mrican-Americans, I want to 
listen with keen attention to those who are developing an Mrican-Ameri-
can interpretation of the civil rights movement and who are studying 
neglected primary sources in their own communities. 66 
Subordinated status plus critical consciousness-raising is the condi-
tion that produces the knowledge I seek. It is a knowledge that was 
largely unavailable to past generations of pragmatists. It is a knowledge 
that is increasingly available to us as we enter the age of the post-colonial 
university.67 
VI. CONCLUSION: PRAGMATISM, ESSENTIALISM, 
AND LIBERATION 
[W]e are not one or ten or ten thousand things. Not one poem. 
We could count ourselves forever and never agree on the number. 
-Elizabeth Alexander68 
During the time of the Harlem renaissance, the industry of criticism 
flourished on the back of the industry of literature. Critics decried the 
racialism and embarrassment of the fascination with Black dialect, rural 
folklore, and Mro-Cuban rhythm. Of the poet Langston Hughes, they 
asked, "Why not exalt our professoriat over our proletariat? Why use 
the vernacular when so many question our ability to use the language of 
the elite?,,69 Race writing emphasizes Blackness in a way that conflicts 
with the broader goals of truth seeking and peaceful coexistence. 
The critics' voices are largely lost to the archives. They deserve 
study both for their substantive challenge and for our understanding of 
the context in which they arose. It is no accident, however, that the 
65. See Mahoney, supra note 20. 
66. See, e.g., A. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMU-
NITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE (1984); Bryan, Her-Story Unsilenced: Black Female Activists in 
the Civil Rights Movement, SAGE, FaIl 1988, at 60; Crawford, Grassroots Activists in the Mississippi 
Civil Rights Movement, SAGE, FaIl 1988, at 24 (studying "the countless, nameless Black women who 
were the backbone of the civil rights struggle in local communities"). 
67. See Rosaldo, Lawrence & Matsuda, Toward a Post-Colonial University: Curriculum, Schol-
arship, Pedagogy and Change (1990) (unpublished manuscript). 
68. E. ALEXANDER, Today's News, in THE VENUS HOITENTOT 51 (1990). 
69. For discussion of the debate between Langston Hughes, W.E.B. DuBois, and others over 
the obligation of the artist to portray African-Americans positively, given their historical devaluing 
in American culture, see Gates, The Black Person in Art: How Should S/he Be Portrayed?, 21 
BLACK AMER. LIT. FORUM 3 (1987). For an excellent essay recovering female participation in the 
Harlem renaissance, see G. HULL, CoLOR, SEX, AND POETRY: THREE WOMEN WRITERS OF THE 
HARLEM RENAISSANCE I (1987). 
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critics are lost to the archives and that what we retain from our present 
vantage is the voice of the poet who wrote, "I, too, sing America."70 
Writers who sing with their native voices and claim for themselves a 
vision born of the structures of power in our society are subject to facile 
critique. Maxine Hong-Kingston is attacked by certain Chinese-Ameri-
can critics, who charge that her particularity does not speak for them.71 
Alice Walker is scorned by certain African-American critics who charge 
that she maligns Black men.72 Catharine MacKinnon is denounced for 
an alleged single focus on sex as a location of power. These women, like 
ages of women before them, stand falsely aceused. 
The easy critique of women warrior writers says that they distort, 
generalize, singularize, and po1emicize, just as the easy critique of the 
anti-subordination pragmatist is that subordination is a moving target. 
The hard critique, the engaged critique, rises to the challenge of recog-
nizing structures of subordination and accounting for those structures in 
both strong and weak manifestations, in contradiction, and in exception. 
This is the promising work that feminists, critical legal scholars, and crit-
ical race theorists are bringing to jurisprudence. 
To approach truth without exalting too soon a claim to it and to 
seek justice without forgetting the fallibility of justice-seekers is my 
quest. Pragmatism, posed as it is on the cusp of the modem and 
postmodem worlds, provides a legacy rich with contradiction and prom-
ise for those who judge theory according to its potential for empowering 
the least powerful among us. The imperative of ending all forms of sub-
ordination and the attempt to define and attain critical consciousness are 
tasks-in-progress. Like the pragmatists of Dewey's time, the liberation 
70. This line is from a famous Langston Hughes poem, "I, Too, Sing America," echoing Walt 
Whitman. It is also the subtitle of volume 1 of a significant two-volume biography of Hughes by 
Arnold Rampersand. 1 A. RAMPERSAND, THE LIFE OF LANGSTON HUGHES: I, Too, SING 
AMERICA 1902-1941 (1986). 
71. M. HONG-KINGSTON, THE WOMAN W ARlUOR: MEMOIRS OF A GIRLHOOD AMONG 
GHOSiS (1982). Criticism of Hong-Kingston is discussed in Wong, Necessity and Extravagance in 
Maxine Hong-Kingston's The Woman Warrior: Art and the Ethnic Experience, 15 MELUS 3 (1988), 
and in Cheung, "Don't Tell": Imposed Silences in The COlor Purple and The Woman Warrior, 103 
PUB. OF THE MODERN LANGUAGE Assoc. 162 (1988). 
72. The criticism of the film version of The Color Purple is discussed in Crenshaw, supra note 
44, at 163. As Professor Crenshaw notes, "[M]ost critics overlooked the positive transformation of 
the primary male character in The Color Purple." Id. at 163 n.63. For a defense of Walker and a 
critic's response, see Barbara Smith and Ismael Reed in Gates, supra note 69. For Ms. Walker's own 
spirited and spiritual defense, see A. WALKER, Coming in From the Cold: Welcoming the Old, 
Funny-Talking Ancient Ones into the Warm Room of Present Consciousness, or, Natty Dread Rides 
Againl and In the Closet of the Soul, in LIVING BY THE WORD 54, 78 (1988). 
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theorists of today know that the road is long, the way uncertain, and the 
choice to retreat not ours. 
All is not well; there is pain at so many levels of our lives-personal 
and political, individual and collective. We can save ourselves and each 
other by listening to the pain and to the dream of human dignity we have 
sustained alongside it. Cornel West calls this prophetic pragmatism, and 
others in our history have called it, simply, freedom. 
